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Summary: Accounts of the founding of the International Labour Organization
(ILO) usually emphasize the role of social-reformist intellectuals and politicians.
Despite the indisputable role of these actors, however, the international labour
movement was the actual initiator of this process. Over the course of World War I,
the international labour movement proposed a comprehensive programme of
protection for the working classes, which, conceived as compensation for its
support of the war, was supposed to become an international agreement after the
war. In 1919, politicians took up this programme in order to give social stability to
the postwar order. However, the way in which the programme was instituted
disappointed the high expectations of trade unions regarding the fulfilment of their
demands. Instead, politicians offered them an institution that could be used, at best,
to realize trade-union demands. Despite open disappointment and sharp critique,
however, the revived International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) very
quickly adapted itself to this mechanism. The IFTU now increasingly oriented its
international activities around the lobby work of the ILO.
Markku Ruotsila recently described the establishment of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) in the spring of 1919 within the
framework of the Paris Peace Conference as the result of an interaction
between social-reformist intellectuals and politicians, in particular in the
months after the end of World War I.1 Likewise, in this issue Jasmien Van
Daele emphasizes the interlocking context in which two important
Belgian leaders, a social-reformist intellectual and a socialist politician,
acted. These are all undoubtedly important moments in the overall
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process. Already in 1934, James T. Shotwell,2 who participated on the
American side in the 1919 negotiations, provided a broad account of the
prehistory and genesis of the ILO. However, in his work Shotwell
presented governments as the main protagonists, concentrating on the
discussions in Paris and the formation of the ILO at the first labour
conference in Washington in November 1919. By contrast, this article
will focus on the role of the international trade-union movement and its
continuous efforts, beginning in 1916, to establish an international labour
organization. In so doing I will take into account the rivalry between the
two camps that emerged in the international trade-union movement
during World War I.
The trade-union federations were the real driving force that pressured
governments to include a social-policy programme in the peace treaty after
the war. This represented a new development in international relations,
although it did build on initial international social agreements from prior
to World War I. In addition, these trade-union initiatives were warmly
welcomed by social-reformist intellectuals, who had themselves long
provided active support, as the two aforementioned articles emphasize.
The creation of the ILO as part of the postwar order, in other words,
emerged from the confluence of these various factors. Although the trade
unions, given the high expectations fostered by the political climate of
1919, were not completely satisfied with the actual result, they quickly
accepted the situation and became the mainstays of the ILO. This marked a
change from the way in which they had perceived themselves before 1914:
they were no longer content to limit themselves to the exchange of
information, but wanted to become international players.
When I refer to the ‘‘international trade-union movement’’ here I mean
primarily the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU). The
IFTU, which was the merger of socialist, and in part syndicalist, national
trade-union federations, was founded in 1901 as the ‘‘International
Secretariat’’ and then renamed in 1913.3 From the outbreak of World
War I, however, the IFTU had been paralysed. The organizations in the
Entente resp. Allied camp denied the legitimacy of its leadership, which
was controlled by the German trade unions, whose chairman, Carl Legien,
was also the IFTU president. Consequently, the international meetings
2. James T. Shotwell (ed.), The Origins of the International Labor Organization, 2 vols (New
York, 1934) [hereafter Origins].
3. On this history, see the relevant sections by Michel Dreyfus and Geert Van Goethem in
Anthony Carew et al., The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Berne, 2000), pp.
25–163. Van Goethem is also the author of a dissertation, at present only available in Dutch, on
the IFTU: De Internationale van Amsterdam. De wereld van het Internationaal Vakverbond
(IVV), 1913–1945 (Antwerp-Ghent, 2003). For a brief overview, see also Reiner Tosstorff,
Kurze Geschichte des Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbundes. 85 Jahre Amsterdamer Internatio-
nale (Hamburg, 2004).
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during the war, which resulted in the initiative that led to the foundation of
the ILO, as well as the meetings immediately after the war were not
technically IFTU meetings, at least not those of the Entente camp. At the
same time, both trade-union camps fought for hegemony over the trade-
union federations of the neutral countries.
The international Christian trade-union movement remained only a
marginal force in this process. First of all, it was far weaker than the IFTU,
and prior to World War I its international structure was very loose. Not
until April 1919 did the Christian trade-union movement again try to unite
into an international movement, in large part due to the social-policy
discussions at the time. However, these efforts remained in the incipient
stages so that it had no influence at all. In addition, differences in the
Christian camp remained irreconcilable. Its worker delegates recognized
their marginal position at the first ILO conference in November 1919, and
this led to the formation of the International Federation of Christian Trade
Unions (IFCTU). (They then sought to participate actively in the ILO, but
were never able to achieve more than a minority status; their relationship
with the IFTU was at times quite competitive and combative.) Thus, one
could say that the ILO acted here as a godfather at the establishment of the
IFCTU, whereas the IFTU, on the contrary, played a decisive role in the
founding of the ILO.4
The current article, however, will focus solely on the question of
international social policy, its substance, and the creation of an institu-
tional framework for it. Broader questions of particular war aims (such as
territorial demands and reparations) or of a comprehensive framework for
peace (which culminated in the idea of a League of Nations) cannot be
addressed here. For this reason, I examine only the discussions of the
international trade unions, leaving aside the ‘‘labour and socialist
conferences’’ that took place on the Allied side in 1918. These latter
meetings dealt with international social policy as one issue among many,
essentially repeating the demands made at the trade-union conferences.
Their first priority was the general question of war goals, i.e. the structure
of the postwar order in accordance with a ‘‘Wilsonian peace’’. Moreover, it
would transcend the scope of this article to take into account ‘‘political’’
participants, without adding significantly to our knowledge of the
development of the ILO or of the trade-union movement’s contribution
to this process.
Unfortunately, it has been practically impossible for the author to rely
on archival documents from trade unions, since most of this material no
4. See Bernhard Otte, ‘‘Internationaler Bund christlicher Gewerkschaften (IBCG)’’, in Ludwig
Heyde (ed.), Internationales Handwo¨rterbuch des Gewerkschaftwesens, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1931), pp.
817–823; Patrick Pasture, Histoire du syndicalisme chre´tien international. La difficile recherche
d’une troisie`me voie (Paris, 1999).
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longer exists (or exists only in fragments). The IFTU archive disappeared
during the German advance on Paris in 1940; a number of trade-union
federations, such as the British General Federation of Trade Unions,
simply disposed of their own records at some point as waste paper.
THE LEEDS PROGRAMME (1916 )
Already at a convention in November 1914, when the United States was
still neutral, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) demanded that the
international trade-union movement have an important say in structuring
the postwar order.5 The AFL called for an international trade-union
conference, which was to be held parallel to the inevitable peace talks and
influence their conclusions. The demand that a new international order be
based on principles such as disarmament, the establishment of courts of
arbitration to settle international disputes, etc. undoubtedly reflected a
widespread conviction in the international trade-union movement. But to
what extent should a peace treaty contain specific worker demands and
conditions for social policy?
At the outbreak of World War I, almost all trade-union federations in
Europe and North America were part of the IFTU, which had its
headquarters in Berlin. Before 1914, its president, Legien, had declared all
general issues to be beyond the competence of the IFTU. Rather, such
issues were to be the responsibility of the Party or the Second
International. Here, Legien followed the German model, which was based
on the Marxist–social-democratic division of labour between the Party
and trade unions.
This position affected not only explicit political problems such as
disarmament, but also the question of an international social policy. After
numerous debates and even initial conferences over the course of the
nineteenth century, the International Association for Labour Legislation
(IALL) was created in 1900 as an association of social-reformist
intellectuals. The IALL, in turn, established an International Labour
Office with headquarters in Basle. This was not an international organi-
zation with officially binding powers, although it was financed by various
European states. It was supposed to provide advice and disseminate
information on social policy. Through expert consultations, the Interna-
tional Labour Office initiated two international agreements, which were
accepted by a diplomatic conference in 1906 (the prohibition of night shifts
for women and the prohibition of the use of white phosphorous in
matchstick production). Independent of this, there was also series of
bilateral agreements between individual countries, which primarily
5. Labor and the War: American Federation of Labor and the Labor Movements of Europe and
Latin America (Washington DC, 1918), pp. 8–10 [hereafter Labor and the War].
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addressed problems arising from immigration. Further initiatives were in
preparation when war broke out. The IFTU did not contribute to these
efforts, since it did not regard participating in the deliberations as part of its
responsibilities. However, an increasing number of national trade-union
federations did send prominent representatives to participate in the
national sections of the IALL.6
But now the international trade-union movement’s lack of interest in
such issues disappeared with the emergence of discussions about influ-
encing a peace treaty. It was no coincidence that the Entente trade-union
organizations, and not Legien or the IFTU, took the first step. The Entente
organizations mainly followed the syndicalist or trade-union model7 and,
already prior to World War I, had rejected a simple division of labour
between politics/party and economy/trade union. However, given the
extraordinary organizational power of German trade unions, this
remained a minority position. After the war began, the situation was
further complicated by the rejection of Legien’s leadership, on the grounds
that he was unable or unwilling to exercise his office impartially.8
An international trade-union conference in Leeds, Great Britain in July
1916 (attended by organizations from the Entente countries) laid the
cornerstone for an international social-policy programme. The impetus for
Leeds was a lengthy document which the leadership of the French
Confe´de´ration Ge´nerale du Travail (CGT), under its secretary Le´on
Jouhaux, had drafted in order to comply with the demands of its federation
of construction workers that ‘‘clauses e´conomiques ouvrie`res’’ [‘‘workers’
economic clauses’’] be included in the peace treaty, thus supplementing the
AFL’s proposal. The document also made the CGT leadership’s position
clear with respect to the growing anti-war minority. It was distributed
among the CGT membership in February 1916 and was published on May
1, 1916.9 Its premise was that an international social-policy programme
needed to be drafted immediately, not after the end of the war.
6. This development is illustrated by, among others: John W. Follows, Antecedents of the
International Labour Organization (Oxford, 1951); Madelein Herren, Internationale Sozialpo-
litik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg: die Anfa¨nge europa¨ischer Kooperation aus der Sicht Frankreichs
(Berlin, 1993); Ursula Ratz, Sozialreform und Arbeiterschaft. Die Gesellschaft fu¨r Soziale Reform
und die sozialdemokratische Arbeiterbewegung von der Jahrhundertwende bis zum Ausbruch
des Ersten Weltkrieges (Berlin, 1980).
7. For the various ‘‘trade-union models’’ see, among others, Jean-Louis Robert et al.,
L’invention des syndicalismes. Le syndicalisme en Europe occidentale a` la fin du XIXe sie`cle
(Paris, 1997).
8. In fact there is reason to doubt that Legien was, as he of course vehemently maintained,
impartial. (Cf. my remarks in Kurze Geschichte des Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbundes,
pp. 12f.) This is valid independently of the fact that the Entente also would have liked to use the
IFTU for its own purposes. It was probably the realization that this was not possible that lead
the Entente trade-union federations to demand the headquarters be transferred to a neutral
country.
9. See Bernard Georges et al., Le´on Jouhaux. Cinquante ans du syndicalisme (Paris, 1962),
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The CGT document stated that the sacrifices of the working class
entitled workers to help shape the postwar order, and warned that
employers would try to shift the costs of the war on to the workers. It
reviewed the development of international labour legislation, going as far
back as Robert Owen’s attempt to bring about international factory
legislation at the Congress of the Holy Alliance in Aachen in 1818, but
referred primarily to international conferences and agreements in the years
prior to World War I. In particular the document praised the work of the
IALL and its International Labour Office. According to the CGT
document, the following issues still had to be resolved: social insurance,
limits on working hours, health and safety, labour statistics, and migration.
The fact that the CGT document referred to the work of the IALL and
its predecessors (since the international trade-union movement had no
clear forerunners on the issues mentioned above) meant that the CGT had
‘‘explicitly annexed this tradition as the special preserve of international
trade unionism’’.10 Yet, as Jouhaux’s biographers noted, the leaders of the
CGT ‘‘n’avaient jamais attache´ un tre`s grand inte´reˆt aux abondants travaux
de cette association’’ [had never shown great interest in the extensive work
of this association].11 Nevertheless, these trade-union issues were by no
means foreign to the CGT; on the contrary, the CGT rank and file
discussed these issues, at times very controversially, and regarded them as
requiring urgent resolution. This sense of urgency was heightened not only
byWorldWar I, but also by the general awareness that postwar conditions
would greatly accelerate a socio-political process, which prior to the war
appeared to progress very slowly. Jouhaux’s himself might have been
influenced by his own experience: As a former worker in a matchstick
factory he must have known of the IALL’s role in the banning of
phosphorus.12
The international trade-union conference in Leeds, attended by British,
French, Italian, and Belgian representatives, met on 15 July 1916, parallel
to the annual general council of the General Federation of Trade Unions
(GFTU).13 The main goal of the Leeds conference was still the
proclamation of an organizational alternative to Legien, and so to the
pp. 232–235; John N. Horne, Labour at War: France and Britain (Oxford, 1991), pp. 321–323.
10. See ibid., p. 323.
11. See Georges et al., Le´on Jouhaux, p. 234. The authors add: ‘‘Il n’en etait pas de meˆme de
certains milieux socialistes ou ‘syndicalistes reformistes’ ’’ [‘‘He [Jouhaux] was not even part of
certain socialist or ‘reformist syndicalist’ milieus’’].
12. Ibid.
13. TheGFTUwas formed in 1899 from sections of the TradesUnionCongress (TUC), above all
to provide mutual support during strikes. Technically independent of the TUC, although its
membership associations belonged to it, theGFTUrepresented theBritish trade-unionmovement
internationally, e.g. in the IFTU. The TUC itself only became interested in international work
during the course of thewar and replaced theGFTU in the IFTU in 1919–1920. For this, seeAlice
Prochaska, History of the General Federation of Trade Unions 1899–1980 (London, 1982).
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hegemony of the ‘‘central powers’’ in the IFTU. However, the agenda now
included the formulation of an international social-policy programme as
well, and the CGT document was distributed among the delegates for this
purpose. In contrast to the demands that IFTU headquarters be transferred
out of Berlin and that an international trade-union conference be held
parallel to the peace talks, the international social-policy programme
generated no debate and was unanimously accepted.14
The delegates to the Leeds conference could not have foreseen how
important their programme was to be. After all, due to the limited
participation at Leeds, they first had to get the entire international trade-
union movement to accept their programme. Accordingly, Jouhaux, as the
conference’s appointed corresponding secretary for the Entente organiza-
tions, sent a circular containing the Leeds programme to all national trade-
union headquarters.15
What were the specific contents of the Leeds programme? It provided
that all workers have equal rights, regardless of their place of work; that
there be freedom to form unions; that migration be controlled by
commissions composed of government, employer, and trade-union
representatives; that all immigrants have equal rights and working
conditions; and that a comprehensive social-insurance system and an
international factory inspection be created. In addition, it provided that
working hours be reduced to a maximum of ten hours per day (and to eight
hours per day for particularly strenuous jobs), with additional restrictions
for women and children; and that there be one-and-a-half days of rest per
week. Finally, it provided for an international commission to make
proposals at future government conferences – proposals which the
International Labour Office in Basle was to ensure were carried out.
Nevertheless, decision-making authority remained with governments, in
that they were to choose the representatives who passed the resolutions at
these conferences. This made it clear that the international trade-union
movement could only try to influence proposals in the preparatory stage.
At any rate, it was hoped that this would lead to the revival of the
movement after World War I. In addition, it was hoped that the social
progress achieved in this way would help stabilize the international
situation and thus secure peace.
14. See the Report of the Seventeenth Annual General Council Meeting and Conference of
International Delegates, Held at the Grand Central Hotel, Briggate, Leeds, on Wednesday,
Thursday, and Friday, July 5th, 6th, and 7th, 1916 (London, 1916), pp. 1–20. The French
document was published by the GFTU as a brochure: Historical Survey of the Efforts to Co-
ordinate and Internationalise Labour Legislation. Prepared by the Confederation du Travail,
June 1916 (London, 1916). It has been reprinted in Shotwell, Origins, vol. 2, pp. 5–22.
15. Reprinted in Klaus Scho¨nhoven (ed.), Die Gewerkschaften in Weltkrieg und Revolution
1914–1919 (Cologne, 1983), pp. 246–252 [hereafter Die Gewerkschaften 1914–1919]; and in
Shotwell, Origins, vol. 2, pp. 23–26.
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Legien countered the challenge of Leeds by reaffirming his claim to
leadership of the IFTU. On 4 October 1916, he informed all national
federations of the Leeds demand that IFTU headquarters be moved out of
Berlin and that a corresponding bureau be established under Jouhaux.
Since this would circumvent the IFTU’s authority, Legien called an
international trade-union conference under the aegis of the IFTU, i.e.
under his own aegis, for 11 December in Berne.16 In doing so, he did not
address the individual points of the Leeds programme. According to a later
account, Jouhaux’s circular, due to war-related delays, didn’t arrive until
the end of October, but was then immediately translated and, although not
discussed, shown to German trade-union leaders at a conference on
November 21–22.17 The report on the conference in the Correspondenz-
blatt, the organ of the German trade unions, did not contain any
information on the Jouhaux circular, much less the text of the Leeds
programme.18
By contrast, the Scandinavian trade unions had already discussed the
text. In fact, at a meeting on 20–21 October in Stockholm, they rejected
the hasty conference that Legien had called to counter the demand to
transfer IFTU headquarters. They were concerned that the short notice
would prevent a broad spectrum of representatives from attending the
conference, and they also demanded a detailed discussion of the Leeds
programme, with which they agreed in principle. They made their position
clear at a meeting with an IFTU representative in Copenhagen on 10–11
November. The very next day, Legien retracted his invitation for 11
December and announced more intensive preparations for a conference at
a later date. He now expressly mentioned the need to discuss the Leeds
programme.19
Legien’s tentative reaction was to become only more contradictory. In a
February 1917 circular20 to IFTU member associations, he argued that
Jouhaux’s text had been sent to all national headquarters in the name of the
Entente organizations’ corresponding bureau. He claimed that the General
Commission of German trade unions had passed it on to the IFTU
(although he headed both organizations at the time!), but that the IFTU
didn’t recognize the corresponding bureau. He claimed he could not take
16. The letter is in Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund. Bericht fu¨r die Jahre 1913 bis 1919
(Berlin, 1919), pp. 45f. [hereafter IGB–Bericht 1913–1919].
17. ‘‘Bewusste Irrefu¨hrung’’, Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften
Deutschlands, no. 46, 11/17/1917 [hereafter Correspondenzblatt]. This article is a polemic by the
General Commission of the German trade unions against a leading USPD trade unionist who
had accused the commission of trying to keep the Leeds programme secret.
18. Correspondenzblatt, no. 49, 2 December 1916. Detailed proceedings of the conference have
not survived.
19. The letter is in IGB–Bericht 1913–1919, pp. 46f.
20. Reprinted in Scho¨nhoven, Die Gewerkschaften 1914–1919, pp. 305–312.
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action unless asked to do so by a national federation and that the
Scandinavian federations had made such a request at the meeting in
Copenhagen. It remained unclear what distinguished the Scandinavians
from the German national federation, i.e. why the German national
federation couldn’t have made the same demand.
In general it appears that Legien was attempting to de-emphasize the
leading role taken by the various trade-union federations of the Entente
camp in Leeds. Legien was not only concerned here with the organiza-
tional challenge to the IFTU’s leadership. International conference records
show that German trade unions (in particular, Legien) had long
pedantically lectured the other organizations21 as to how German trade
unions represented the height of socio-political progress. This was directed
mainly, although not exclusively, at the leftist critics in the syndicalist
camp, for example, the CGT.22
In February 1917, Legien finished writing the aforementioned circular
and his own proposal for a social-policy programme, but then put
everything again on hold due to the intensification of the war (submarine
warfare).23 Only in May, when an international trade-union conference
became possible in Stockholm (in connection with a proposed interna-
tional conference of the socialist parties), did Legien suddenly feel a
sense of urgency. At this point, claiming that it was once again ‘‘possible
to send mail to England and overseas’’, he sent his documents to the
various national trade-union headquarters. They were then published in
the Correspondenzblatt along with Jouhaux’s text from September
1916.24
In his circular, Legien not only addressed the entire situation post-
Leeds, but also, evidently after detailed discussions, took positions on
the Leeds programme point-for-point. In general, he agreed with it.
Aside from a few minor issues, most of his comments focused on
immigration-related problems. Legien stated that they needed to halt all
immigration that threatened either trade unions’ ability to organize or
their social and economic achievements. He was particularly sceptical
about recruiting ‘‘coloured workers’’. Legien warned against expecting
that that the various social-insurance systems could quickly be brought
21. Gompers, the American trade-union chairman at the time, has this to say about Legien in his
memoirs: ‘‘He was German from the tip of his toes to the last hair of his head and assumed a
general attitude of German superiority’’; Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor: An
Autobiography, 2 vols (New York, 1943), vol. 2, p. 39 [hereafter Seventy Years].
22. For the endemic conflict between the German and French trade unions within the IFTU
prior to World War I, see: Susan Milner, The Dilemmas of Internationalism: French Syndicalism
and the International Labour Movement 1900–1914 (Oxford, 1990).
23. This is the reason given in the article, ‘‘Bewusste Irrefu¨hrung’’, Correspondenzblatt, no. 46,
17 November 1917.
24. Correspondenzblatt, no. 21, 26 May 1917.
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into alignment and demanded further restrictions on labour by women
and children.
However, he also articulated a perennial problem of international
social policy: the demands, this time those made in Leeds, did not go far
enough; ‘‘They fell far short of providing the protection of the working
classes that organized labour has demanded for decades.’’ Many of the
Leeds demands, Legien continued, were already realities in some
countries; the point was to break the resistance of countries that were
‘‘backward in social policy’’, and to establish international agreement as
to a minimum set of demands. Implicit in this proposal, however, was a
problem that was to cause constant concern in the future: an
internationally binding set of minimum regulations, while improving
conditions in some countries, could also roll back advanced social policies
already achieved in others.
In his draft, entitled, ‘‘Peace Demands of the International Trade-Union
Federation’’ [Friedensforderungen des Internationalen Gewerkschafts-
bundes], Legien sought to establish general principles that were detailed
and yet avoided measures for individual trades.25 His first section provided
for freedom of movement on the international job market, though this
freedom could be limited by specific government measures (such as in the
case of functional illiteracy or economic crises). His draft went on to state
that freedom to organize and comprehensive social insurance were to be
guaranteed; that no-one was to work more than ten hours in a day; that an
eight-hour day was to go into effect for some occupations immediately,
and, ten years after the peace accord, the eight-hour day should be
established for everyone. Other measures in his draft addressed industrial
health and safety, cottage industries, and women and children. His
demands did not differ essentially from those of the Leeds programme,
although his catalogue was more extensive and was more radical on some
individual issues.
Legien’s draft, however, clearly differed from the Leed’s programme in
its detailed section on the realization of international labour legislation.
This section expressly provided for a factory inspection in every country,
which would include the participation of trade unions. In addition, it gave
the International LabourOffice in Basle, at which the IFTUwas to have an
official representative, a comprehensive advisory and supervisory role in
international labour legislation, despite the fact that it was ultimately a
private institution. The legislation would be passed by regular interna-
tional conferences composed of government representatives. All of this
tended to provide for more internationally binding legislation than the
Leeds programme had.
25. Ibid.
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: : : AND BERNE (1917 )
In April 1917, the international socialist movement proposed the idea of a
conference in Stockholm, and Legien sought to use this to set up his own
international trade-union conference. Since he was not able to convene it
with the help of a trade-union federation from a neutral country
(Switzerland), he had the IFTU office in Amsterdam issue an invitation.26
However, this detour didn’t work either, since the Entente trade-union
federations boycotted it, and Legien was left with representatives solely
from the Central Powers and neutral countries. This conference was held
on 8 June.27 There was sharp criticism of the hurried preparations. At the
conference the delegates didn’t even allow Legien to explain the Leeds
programme and the IFTU’s counter-proposal. Nevertheless, they ex-
pressly recognized the Leeds initiative in that they acknowledged the
principle of drawing up an independent social-policy programme (even
though it might compete with those of social democratic parties).28 They
scheduled a comprehensive conference (which was to include representa-
tives from the Entente countries) to discuss and finalize the wording in
Berne in the autumn of 1917.
However, before this conference could convene – in the interim the
United States had declared war, and the AFL was therefore no longer a
‘‘neutral’’ national federation – the organizations in the Entente camp
made their position clear at a conference in London in mid-September
1917.29 The central issue was participation at the Berne conference. In
any event, the transfer of IFTU headquarters out of Berlin was also on
the agenda at Berne. Given the difficulty of counterbalancing this with a
confrontation with the enemy, the participants in London were unable
to reach an agreement. The British and Americans declared from the
outset that they would not sit at the same table with the Germans as
long as the war continued. Johaux objected just because he thought a
26. Bericht der Zweigestelle Amsterdam des Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbundes vom
Dezember 1914 bis Ma¨rz 1919, (no place or date given), p. 8 [hereafter Bericht der Zweigstelle
Amsterdam]. After World War I broke out, Legien had, with help of the Dutch trade unions, set
up an office headed by Jan Oudegeest, the Dutch trade-union Chairman, in order to have ‘‘non-
partisan’’ contact with opposing trade-union organizations.
27. The proceedings are in Internationaler Gewerkschaftsbund Bericht fu¨r die Jahre 1913 bis
1917 (Berlin, 1919), pp. 12–20 [hereafter IGB–Bericht 1913–1917].
28. Legien stated, ‘‘When it comes out that the trade-union movement is dealing with questions
of social policy, the Socialist peace conferences will be forced to take them into consider-
ation:::.’’; ibid., p. 18.
29. See Conference of Representatives of National Federations of the Trade Unions of the
Entente Powers. Held in the Offices of the General Federation of Trade Unions, London, on
September 10th and 11th, 1917 (London, 1917). The German trade unions published a
translation: Konferenz von Vertretern der Gewerkschaften der Ententema¨chte. Abgehalten im
Haus der General Federation of Trade-Unions London am 10. und 11. September 1917 (Berlin,
n.d.).
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transfer was possible. This difference of opinion monopolized a great
deal of the conference. By contrast, the Leeds demands elicited no
further discussion. They were approved and information was presented
on corresponding initial initiatives that had been taken with govern-
ments.
At the same time, the AFL representatives also expressed the funda-
mental misgivings of their organization about any kind of legal and
therefore state control of working conditions.30 Jouhaux, however,
apparently made a convincing objection to the AFL position, which has
traditionally been described as ‘‘voluntarism’’.31 He stated that the Leeds
programme did not propose specific laws, but rather that laws already in
effect in the several countries be standardized so that poorer working
conditions in one country could not be used as an argument to defeat
demands for better ones in another. The two AFL delegates did not
comment on this, but probably remained distrustful of any legislation,
including international labour legislation. (In fact, at the AFL convention
in November 1917 this critique of the Leeds programme was again
explicitly repeated.)32
Nevertheless, the London conference delegates did not dispute that the
international trade-union movement should support the general demo-
cratic war aims, and they unanimously approved a resolution to this effect.
This led to a discussion of the colonial problem, however, which suggested
30. One of the two AFL delegates stated, ‘‘We are suspicious of minimumwages and limitations
of hours fixed by Government. We have the fear that in these things there is a surrender to the
Government, and that something is being done which may react strongly in the future’’; ibid.,
p. 26.
31. Rainer Erd, Die amerikanischen Gewerkschaften im New Deal 1933–1937 (Frankfurt,
1986), pp. 33f., describes this conception as follows: ‘‘As an organization of qualified skilled
workers, the majority of whom were active in the craft trades, the AFL pleaded for restricting
itself to working as an autonomous force for unions to attain improved wages and working
conditions.’’ This ‘‘voluntarism’’, however, remained within the limits of the capitalist system
(where, as Gompers laconically expressed it, one only wanted ‘‘more’’) and thus rejected any
socialist- or Marxist-inspired attempt to overcome capitalism.
32. ‘‘It is our opinion that the Leeds program is not sufficiently constructive or comprehensive
to enable the workers to take best advantage of the opportunity that will come in the Peace
Congress. We feel that the Peace Congress will necessarily have to recommend some
fundamental proposals for the better organization of international relations in order that in
the future there may be some permanent agencies for dealing with the problems that arise in
international affairs and to enable the nations to co-operate for the better management of their
common interests and their individual needs. Labor is vitally interested in the character and
scope of such proposals and cannot afford to neglect the preparation of a concrete program. The
Leeds program does not contain suggestions dealing with this broader problem of international
organization. Many of the specific articles in the Leeds program are concerned with matters of a
legislative nature, many of which in our country come under the jurisdiction of the several states
and not of the federal government. For this reason alone, it would be inexpedient, so far as our
country is concerned, to have these subjects included in the terms of an international peace
treaty’’; Labor and the War, pp. 51f.
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that the motives of the Allies were not so universally democratic after all.
In any case, the delegates had once again made it clear that the trade-union
movement wanted a voice at the peace talks: either at a congress parallel to
the peace talks (the original position of the AFL) or via inclusion in the
government delegations (the majority proposal). In the end the AFL
delegates endorsed the latter, since the motive for both proposals was the
same.
However, the hope that the subsequent conference in Berne on 1–4
October 191733 could unite the two opposing war camps under the banner
of Leeds proved fallacious. On the one hand, as was to be expected, the
British, Americans, and Belgians, joined now by the Canadians,
announced that they would not send representatives to a Berne conference
dominated by the Germans. On the other hand, the French (who had
provided the ‘‘inspiration’’ for Leeds) and the Italians failed to attend,
although solely because their respective governments refused to issue them
with passports. The French in particular had pinned their hopes on
attending the Berne conference as they expected to bring about the transfer
of the headquarters out of Berlin. To achieve this they had even declared
their willingness to exclude discussion of the ‘‘question of war guilt’’, an
issue that would certainly have broken up the conference.
As was to be expected, the Berne conference delegates, given the limited
participation, deferred discussion of transferring the headquarters until a
truly representative conference could be convened. Consequently, ‘‘peace
demands’’ became the actual focus of the Berne conference. Stephan Bauer,
the director of the International Labour Office in Basle, attended as a
guest. The various national federations had submitted changes and
additions to Legien’s draft, which were discussed by a committee.
Unfortunately, the proceedings of this committee have not survived, and
thus it is impossible to reconstruct the objections to the draft. The
committee spokesman, Wilhelm Jansson, reported only in general terms
that most objections raised addressed particular conditions in individual
countries. He mentioned only two specific proposed changes: a Dutch
proposal that an old-age pension system financed by the state (i.e. by taxes)
and one financed by insurance premiums be declared equivalent; and a
Swiss proposal that the eight-hour day be proclaimed a general goal.
Jansson objected to the latter proposal, arguing that the general goal
should first be a ten-hour day, since this would already be a great
achievement in many countries. He argued that they should then quickly
strive for the eight-hour day, as called for in Legien’s draft, and he repeated
Legien’s aforementioned basic principle of laying down general worker
demands, not those of specific trades.
33. Protokoll der Internationalen Gewerkschafts-Konferenz vom 1. bis 4. Oktober 1917 im
Volkshaus in Bern (Berne, 1917) [hereafter Protokoll IGB-Konferenz Bern 1917].
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The full conference then, without further discussion, unanimously
adopted a text that was largely identical to Legien’s original draft. They
added passages regarding cottage industry and the implementation of
labour standards, as well as an extra section to establish international
maritime labour standards, despite the fact that measures for specific trades
were generally not to be included. It was clear, however, that this latter
branch of industry was internationally organized and so should be
internationally regulated. The only really important addition was a special
regulation to ensure equal pay for equal work for both men and women.
In this way, traversing the path from Leeds to Berne, organizations from
the two war camps as well as the neutral countries helped legitimate an
international postwar social-policy programme. Immediately after the
Berne decision, the Austrian delegate, Franz Domes, submitted a request
that the IFTU participate at future peace negotiations. In fact, the Leeds
and Berne programmes did not differ essentially in orientation. The Berne
programme was more comprehensive and contained more binding
formulations about enforcement and supervision through an international
labour office. However, these differences were only minor variations on a
common theme. The German’s oft-repeated contention that the Leeds
demands did not go nearly far enough34 was in the end merely quibbling,
which the German IFTU leadership used to conceal the fact that the real
issue was war-related competition, i.e. that others had taken the
fundamental initiative. This did not, however, prevent the more polished
Berne programme from overshadowing the Leeds programme after the
war, at least in public opinion. The German leadership under Legien was
certainly not opposed to this, and the February 1919 conference in Berne
only reinforced this public impression.
In any case, in accordance with the instructions he had received at the
conference,35 Legien sent the text of the Berne decision to all IFTU
organizations on 1 December 1917, with the request that the Berne
programme be carried out.36 The Allied camp did not react, e.g. by
reworking the Leeds programme in light of Berne. At the ‘‘Inter-Allied
Labour and Socialist Conferences’’ in February and September 1918,
international social policy was subordinated to general political demands
34. Legien had already stated this in his February 1917 circular on the Leeds programme [see n.
20]. Even more absurd, when one compares the texts, was Jansson’s statement at a conference of
the German trade-union organizations in July, ‘‘the opinion that the Leeds demands are identical
to ours is false [:::] we cannot accept the particulars of the Leeds programme’’; Scho¨nhoven, Die
Gewerkschaften 1914–1919, p. 376. Cf. Horne’s point of view in Labour at War, p. 326: ‘‘Yet for
all the nuances of difference, the essential thrust of the German proposals was similar to that of
the clause ouvrie`res adopted at Leeds.’’
35. The request came from Leipart, Protokoll IBG-Conferenz Bern 1917, pp. 28f.
36. This is briefly mentioned in, Bericht der Zweigstelle Amsterdam, p. 15. Unfortunately
Legien’s own report [IBG-Bericht 1913–1919] doesn’t even mention his letter, much less reprint
it. Thus one can only speculate on what it may have said about the Berne decisions.
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for a postwar order, mainly because the national delegations included
politicians as well as trade unionists (with the exception of the US
delegation, since the AFL had not consented to the participation of the US
Socialist Party). At the conferences, social policy was addressed only
through the formulation of general principles. AFL President Samuel
Gompers, in particular, attached importance to such principles, with his
formulation of a general programme, i.e. of a ‘‘labor charter’’.37 This
charter, however, also reflected the AFL’s critical view of international
social legislation.
GOVERNMENT REACTIONS
Immediately after Leeds and Berne, national trade-union federations in
both war camps presented their social-policy programmes to their
respective governments. For example, the British organization sent the
Leeds demands to Prime Minister Asquith on 30 August 1916. It was
hoped that these demands would lead to talks among the Allied
governments, even though they didn’t necessarily intend to initiate a
discussion of war aims. They merely reminded Asquith that, in the past,
the poor had always paid the price of war, stated that it was time to
consider the general good, and awaited an answer. Asquith, however, did
no more than briefly confirm receipt of the Leeds programme.38 When he
was ousted in December 1916, he still had not expressed an opinion on its
contents, and his successor, Lloyd George, also did not consider these
issues important before the end of World War I.
The German trade unions proved to be more obstinate. After the Berne
conference, in November 1917, their General Commission wrote to the
German Chancellor and, at the same time, informed members of the
Reichstag.39 Only at the end of February 1918 did the German government
reply that it was willing to discuss the Berne programme, and even then its
willingness may have only been due to the fact that the leftist bourgeois
social reformers of the Gesellschaft fu¨r Soziale Reform (GfSR) [Society for
Social Reform], the German section of the IALL, had adopted the Berne
programme. One of the leaders of the GfSR had been a guest at the Berne
conference and the GfSR had submitted its own petition to the German
Chancellor, although its language was more general and it contained fewer
concrete demands.40
37. Carol Riegelmann, ‘‘War-Time Trade Union and Socialist Proposals’’, in Shotwell, Origins,
where the corresponding resolutions are found in vol. 1, pp. 55–79, 68–70, and vol. 2, pp. 52–69,
75–80. See also Horne, Labour at War, pp. 329–331.
38. The letter and Asquith’s brief confirmation of receipt are in General Federation of Trade
Unions: Eighteenth Annual Report and Balance Sheet (London, 1917), pp. 23f.
39. This letter is in Scho¨nhoven, Die Gewerkschaften 1914–1919, pp. 382–391.
40. Ursula Ratz, Zwischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft und Koalition. Bu¨rgerliche Sozialreformer und
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On 18 March 1918, the Reich’s Office of Economic Affairs [Reichs-
wirtschaftsamt] discussed the Berne programme, without, however,
arriving at any concrete results. On the contrary, it was clear that the
German government wanted to postpone discussion of the entire matter
and avoid taking any official position until after World War I. This did
result in sharp criticism from the General Commission of German trade
unions and from the GfSR, which the German government simply
ignored.41 It also ignored criticism that it had missed an opportunity to
set an example for social-policy reform in the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty,
which had been signed with Soviet Russia two weeks earlier. The record
indicates only that a GfSR representative made this reproach, but the
General Commission of German trade unions had already reminded the
German government of the need for including a corresponding section at
the end of January 1918, when it became known that German industrialists
were influencing the Brest-Litovsk peace talks.42
Since the aforementioned efforts had not been successful, the General
Commission of German trade unions had the German Social Democratic
Party bring the matter before the Reichstag. On March 21, 1918, the Main
Budget Committee (Hauptausschuss) passed a resolution demanding that a
minimum set of social-policy demands be included in a peace treaty. The
government representative present stated that the government was
sympathetic to the entire matter.43 The next day the Reichstag endorsed
his statement.44 A few days later, in a clear reference to the Reichstag
decision, the General Commission, in its position statement on Brest-
Litovsk, once again criticized the lack of social-policy clauses in that
treaty.45 It is doubtful that Soviet Russia, given the enormous obligations it
had to Germany – obligations that were only of secondary importance to
Gewerkschaften im Ersten Weltkrieg (Munich, 1994), pp. 387–392. See also Ewald Kuttig,
‘‘German Preparations and Proposals’’, in Shotwell, Origins, vol. 1, pp. 221–234.
41. Jansson, one of the two representatives of the General Commission, wrote a memorandum
about this meeting. It is contained in Scho¨nhoven, Die Gewerkschaften 1914–1919, pp. 391f.
42. ‘‘Zur Lage’’, Correspondenzblatt, no. 4, 26 January 1918. Nevertheless, no social-policy
issues of any kind were addressed at the peace talks, as is obvious from documentation of the
negotiations; see Werner Hahlweg (ed.), Der Friede von Brest. Ein unvero¨ffentlichter Band aus
dem Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Deutschen Verfassunggebenden Nationalversamm-
lung und des Deutschen Reichstages (Dusseldorf, 1971).
43. Der Hauptausschuß des Deutschen Reichtags 1915–1918, 4 vols (Dusseldorf, 1983), vol. 4,
pp. 2080f.
44. Verhandlungen des Reichtags, vol. 311, p. 4570. A specific discussion of this issue did not
take place. A few speakers endorsed this point in the context of the general debate on the Brest-
Litovsk Peace Treaty (as well as on a few riders to it), but more important issues naturally
attracted the assembly’s attention. Curiously, a report at a conference of German trade-union
leaders turned ‘‘social-policy’’ demands in the Reichstag proceedings into ‘‘socialist’’ demands.
Had this really been the case, the issue would hardly have been approved by a wide majority of
the Reichstag. See Scho¨nhoven, Die Gewerkschaften 1914–1919, pp. 445f.
45. ‘‘Frieden im Osten’’, Correspondenzblatt, no. 13, 30 March 1918.
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the German trade-union leadership – could have financed progress in
social policy as well. However, as Bieber correctly notes, the German trade
unions raised these demands primarily to achieve recognition from the
Kaiser’s government and so to ensure that their influence was equal to that
of German industrialists.46
This process was repeated in August 1918, when the economic
supplementary treaties to the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty were finalized.
Once again, they contained no social clauses. Once again, the German
government struggled to find excuses, this time before a delegation of the
General Commission to the German Chancellor. (The delegation had
actually been sent to speak about the worsening supply situation.) The
government claimed that the haste with which the treaty had had to be
concluded meant these issues had been deferred, but that they had not been
forgotten, adding that a complete social-policy programme had already
beenworked out for future peace negotiations.47 TheGeneralCommission,
however, had heard such explanations a number of times before and reacted
by uniting with the Swiss trade-union federation to plan an international
campaign of public addresses.48 Had this campaign actually taken place, it
would undoubtedly have led to an open confrontation with the German
government, something which, up to that point, the General Commission
had tried its best to avoid. This indicates how much the government’s
constant evasive tactics must have frustrated the Commission.
At the beginning of October 1918, in preparation for the imminent
German collapse, a German government was formed under Max von
Baden (with the direct participation of the Social Democratic Party). This
new government made social-policy demands part of its peace agenda, as
the German Chancellor announced in his inaugural address on October
5.49 With substantial participation by experts from trade unions (including
Jansson) and the GfSR, work began on drafting the promised demands and
was not interrupted even during the November Revolution. Taking up this
draft, the newGerman government then completed its own draft at the end
of December.50 It was to be published in the German press at the
beginning of February 1919 and then used in the peace talks in slightly
modified form.
46. Hans-Joachim Bieber, Gewerkschaften in Krieg und Revolution. Arbeiterbewegung,
Industrie, Staat und Milita¨r in Deutschland 1914–1920, 2 vols (Hamburg, 1981), vol. 1, p.
494. Pp. 492–498 provide a general description of the ambiguous position the German trade-
union leadership held on Brest-Litovsk. This position differs starkly from the vehement protests
that this leadership under Legien later made against the Versailles treaty.
47. ‘‘Die Gewerkschaften beim Reichskanzler’’, and ‘‘Die Sozialpolitik und die Friedensvert-
ra¨ge’’, Correspondenzblatt, no. 38, 21 September 1918.
48. See Rechenschaftsbericht der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands vom 1.
Juni 1914 bis 31. Mai 1919 (Berlin, 1919), p. 193.
49. Verhandlungen des Reichtags, vol. 314, p. 6152.
50. Ratz, Zwischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft und Koalition, pp. 397–399.
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Within the Allied camp work on such a programme had also begun.
Already in summer 1917 the French government had established a
committee for this purpose.51 This committee, however, was far from
finishing its work by the Armistice and, as a result, was pressured by the
French National Assembly. The French committee then worked closely
with British representatives. Discussions progressed rapidly, turning to
preparations for the imminent peace conference.52 Experts from the
French section of the IALL, with their long experience in the prewar
discussions, played a leading role in this process (whereas the CGT, fully
occupied with its growing internal problems, remained virtually outside
it). The French could not present a definite proposal, however, until early
February 1919, soon after the special committee created by the Allied
Powers had begun discussions.53 This proposal provided for internation-
ally binding social standards and for a permanent institution to regulate
them.
By contrast, only very elementary preparations had been undertaken in
the US.54 Experts, primarily from the IALL, had compiled information on
the status of social policy for the War Labor Board. However, the position
papers based on this information were not finished until January 1919, and
so they had to be sent subsequently to the US peace delegation, which had
already left for Paris. More so than in the other countries, one expert was
largely responsible for the United States’ national initiative: James T.
Shotwell. He had advised President Wilson since 1917, in particular on
social issues, and was now amember of the US peace delegation. Shotwell’s
expectations, however, were very modest. During the journey to Paris, he
drafted a memorandum on child labour, which he expected would be
banned by the peace accord, just as the ViennaCongress had once outlawed
the slave trade.55 When he arrived in Paris in early January, however, he
realized that the international talks had advanced far beyond this stage.
With great enthusiasm, he then took up the proposals from other countries
and tried to convince Wilson and the rest of the US delegation to adopt
them.AFLPresident, SamuelGompers, also arrived inParis in January, not,
however, as a member of the US peace delegation, something he had hoped
and striven for, but, initially at least, only to participate in discussions with
the European workers’ movement.56 Wilson, however, soon gave him an
official mission.
51. The following summary is taken from Charles Picquenard, ‘‘French Preparations’’, in
Shotwell, Origins, vol. 2, pp. 83–97.
52. Cf. the documentation of the French preparatory discussions in ibid., pp. 92–108, 116,
131–133.
53. The French draft of international workers’ legislation is in ibid., pp. 323–327.
54. See Leifur Magnusson, ‘‘American Preparations’’, in ibid., pp. 97–105
55. The Autobiography of James T. Shotwell (Indianapolis, IN [etc.], 1961), pp. 95f.
56. Gompers makes clear in his autobiography (Seventy Years, vol. 2, pp. 476f.) that he was
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The British government had made the most intensive preparations,57
despite the fact that, during World War I, it had limited itself mainly to
following international social-policy discussions through the Intelligence
Division of the Ministry of Labour, and so didn’t really begin work on
these issues until after the Armistice. At that point, in order to prevent
converting the peace treaty into a social-policy agreement, the British
government began to consider establishing a special organization, which
would take care of international social policy in the future. This would
require separate discussions during the peace talks and so, when France
indicated agreement, the British formed a separate ‘‘labour section’’ within
their peace delegation. Under the leadership of the trade-unionist Barnes,
formerly a member of the British Labour Party but now an independent
minister, this labour section then began recruiting experts from various
ministries.
In early January 1919 the British transferred their discussions to Paris,
where they were able to consult with the French, the US peace delegation,
and others. These talks quickly produced several concrete proposals. One
was the formation of a permanent international office to host regularly
scheduled meetings. This was an improvement on the prewar system, in
which conferences were called only after prolonged diplomatic negotia-
tions, which were themselves dependent on fortuitous circumstances.
Another problem raised in the talks was how to define a method to ensure
the decisions made at these meetings were binding.
How were the representatives to this new international organization to
be chosen? As many countries as possible were to be members, although
they would not all be equally important. In addition to this, not only
governments, but also employers’ and workers’ representatives had to be
taken into consideration. Labour Party and Trades Union Congress
representatives now joined the discussion on these issues and together
developed the idea of the ‘‘tripartite’’ representation that still characterizes
the International Labour Organization (ILO) today. By the end of January
1919, the British had drafted a detailed proposal that contained a concrete
plan for the new institution, as well as minimum social standards.58
Already on 18 January 1919, at the first session of the peace conference,
disappointed that Wilson did not appoint him to the peace delegation. Other national trade-
union organizations, above all those of the Allied countries, had also hoped to have ‘‘workers’
representatives’’ in their countries’ official peace delegations. These expectations were also
disappointed. See Gerhard A. Ritter, ‘‘Einleitung’’, in idem, Die II Internationale 1918/1919.
Protokolle, Memoranden, Berichte und Korrespondenzen, 2 vols (Berlin [etc.], 1980, vol. 1,
pp. 1–98, 16f. [hereafter Die II. Internationale 1918/1919]. By contrast social democrats and
trade unions were represented in the delegations of the former Central Powers. In the end the
social democrats were included in the German government in 1919.
57. The following is taken from Edward J. Phelan, ‘‘British Preparations’’, in Shotwell, Origins,
vol. 1, pp. 105–126.
58. A British memorandum on the principles and the first draft of the agreement (dated 21
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the delegates officially decided to place ‘‘international labour legislation’’
on the agenda. The conference asked all delegations to submit their views
on this. In the following days, a British proposal, via official and unofficial
discussions, led to the proposal to appoint a special commission to work
out a binding agreement. The US delegation proposed an amendment,
which was immediately accepted, that the new organization be part of the
future League of Nations. The precise composition of the commission was
then negotiated and the commission was officially appointed on 31
January.59 It began its work the very next day.
THE BERNE CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 1919
What possibility of intervention did the international trade-union move-
ment have as of February 1919? Its two former war camps had not yet
formally adopted a common position. In addition, the demand for an
international consultation of the trade-union movement parallel to the
postwar peace conference, a proposal that had been supported enthusias-
tically during the war, now proved difficult to realize.
The problem was that the workers’ organizations from the different
countries had completely different objectives. Gompers wanted to
convene an exclusive trade-union conference. In particular, he wanted it
to recreate the IFTU as an organization that would be free of the previous
dominant German influence, and that would clearly distance itself from
‘‘political socialism’’. In opposition to this, others, above all the British
Labour Party, wanted a mixed social-democratic–trade-union conference.
As late as autumn 1918, on a visit to England, Gompers had given the
impression that he would go along with this.
A detailed description of the development of these competing initiatives
does not interest us here.60 The end result, however, was that an attempt to
hold a conference in Paris failed, because the Allied organizations objected
that the presence of German representatives there would cause mass
protests. A neutral country, Switzerland, then offered the city of Berne as
an alternative location. However, when Gompers arrived in Europe in
January 1919, he had made it clear that the AFL would not attend a
conference where ‘‘politicians’’ were present. This led Jouhaux, in the
name of the corresponding bureau created at Leeds, to call for special
January 1919) can be found in ibid., vol. 2, pp. 117–125, 138–140; the 26 January 1919 and 2
February 1919 British drafts can be found in ibid., vol. 1, pp. 372–422.
59. Cf. the version in ibid., pp. 124–126. For the corresponding sections of the minutes: ibid.,
vol. 2, pp. 126, 141–143.
60. For a detailed account see Ritter, ‘‘Einleitung’’. For Gompers’s point of view, see his
autobiography, Seventy Years, vol. 2, pp. 480–485. As he stated on p. 470, he saw the AFL
threatened by ‘‘Bolsheviks and near-Bolsheviks of all lands’’.
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trade-union discussions parallel to the ‘‘main conference’’ called by the
socialist parties in Berne (whose delegations were supplemented in several
cases by trade-union representatives; the CGT, however, did not
participate). The letter of invitation stated that this special trade-union
conference would address the Leeds programme.61
Legien was unable to keep up with these developments. He had
energetically defended his right to the IFTU presidency throughout World
War I. As early as October 1918, when it became clear that the German
collapse was imminent, Legien did everything he could to maintain the
initiative. He had Oudegeest of the IFTU’s Amsterdam office call an IFTU
conference in Amsterdam on March 8, 1919. The invitation stated that, in
addition to the issues surrounding a reorganization of the IFTU, the
conference would address the demands from Leeds and Berne.62
Jouhaux’s special trade-union conference, however, thwarted Legien’s
plan. Oudegeest had to attend this conference in Berne, and the conference
that Legien had planned for 8 March 1919, had to be cancelled. Thus, the
Berne trade-union conference, held from 5–9 February 1919,63 was not a
legitimate IFTU conference, but the bulk of IFTU member organizations
attended. Although German trade unions did participate, Legien himself
did not attend. He was undoubtedly aware of how divisive his presence
would have been. Led by Gompers, the Americans officially boycotted the
conference since it was so close to the political conference. For the same
reason the GFTU (the British IFTU member organization) did not send a
delegation.64 The Belgian trade unions didn’t attend either, following the
lead of the Belgian Social Democratic Party, which had decided not to take
part since the Germans were invited.
The special trade-union conference in Berne addressed holding an
official IFTU conference as soon as possible in order to resolve
organizational and leadership issues. However, its main item of business
was the Leeds or the Berne programme, with delegates from the former
Allied camp emphasizing the first, and those from the former Entente
camp emphasizing the second.
Some trade-union conference delegates also attended the Berne
‘‘political’’ conference, which was held from 3–10 February 1919.65 One
61. Reprinted in Ritter, Die II. Internationale 1918/1919, vol. 2, p. 770.
62. IGB-Bericht 1913–1919, pp. 62–64; Bericht der Zweigstelle Amsterdam, pp. 12–14.
63. Protokoll der Internationalen Gewerkschaftskonferenz vom 5. bis 9. Februar 1919 im
Volkshaus in Bern (Berne, 1919).
64. General Federation of Trade Unions: Twentieth Annual Report and Balance Sheet (London,
1919), p. 7. TUC representatives who had come for the political conference, however, also took
part in the trade-union conference at times. This was the first indication that, in the following
months, the ‘‘mother organization’’ (the TUC) would drive the GFTU out of the international
trade-union movement.
65. The proceedings of the political conference are contained in Ritter, Die II. Internationale
1918/1919, vol. 1, pp. 179–570.
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of the main items on this conference’s agenda was, of course, the
reconstruction of the Second International. Even more important were
the shaping of the postwar order through the proposed League of Nations
and the fundamental question of ‘‘democracy or dictatorship?’’ (i.e. the
issue of distinguishing themselves from the Bolsheviks). This conference
also took up the issue of influencing international social policy, but not as a
main agenda item. Both conferences created separate commissions to
address this issue, but these two commissions were linked by the fact that
the same person, Wilhelm Jansson of the German trade unions, chaired
both of them. In addition, several other delegates were members of both
commissions. This ensured that the demands the two commissions
formulated would have as similar language as possible.66
On 5 February 1919, the first day of the trade-union conference, Jansson
made it clear in his introductory report on the social-policy issue that they
had to build upon the Leeds and Berne programmes. He now saw
practically no difference between these two programmes, except on the
issue of how to regulate migration.67 Apart from minor issues, he found
two points worthy of further attention. Given the entire international
situation, he argued, they had to demand an eight-hour day for everyone.
Jansson also stated that the International Labour Office in Basle, whose
head, Stephan Bauer, was present as a guest of the conference, should give
government and trade-union representatives equal participation in its
management. In addition to the International Labour Office, Jansson
called for an international labour parliament, also to be composed of an
equal number of government and trade-union representatives, to develop
international labour legislation. Jansson didn’t provide for separate
representation for employers, since he clearly saw them as represented
by ‘‘bureaucrats’’, i.e. governments. In any case, his proposal was a clear
advance on that made in 1917, which had given only government
representatives the authority to decide what form international labour
legislation would take.
Jouhaux followed up on Jansson’s statements in a supplementary report.
One issue that he particularly emphasized was the newly incorporated
demand for free university education, so that not only ‘‘the children of the
bourgeoisie’’, but also promising working-class children could study.
However, he also emphasized that they were all merely measures to be
taken within the capitalist system, and stated, ‘‘Now as always we must
pursue our goal of liberating the working class; we must never see
bourgeois reform as our salvation.’’
After a brief discussion, the trade-union conference created a commis-
66. For the details, see ibid., p. 435.
67. The Leeds programme placed more emphasis on the organization and control of migration,
whereas the Berne programme ruled out a general prohibition of migration, but called for
limitations under certain conditions.
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sion, which recommended a resolution on 8 February 1919. In the
meantime, the conference addressed the main agenda item, the reorganiza-
tion of the IFTU. The new social-policy programme was drafted in three
languages and contained only minor additions. The only important one
was a proclamation introduced by Jouhaux, which stated that the
programme was the product of discussions of the previous years, that
the future labour office should be placed within the framework of the
League of Nations, and that the ultimate goal was to move beyond the
existing social order.
In the course of discussions on the draft, delegates proposed a series of
additions. The conference, however, refused to enter into the details again
since this would delay passage of the resolution. It was then passed
unanimously, along with Jouhaux’s proclamation. Divided into fifteen
points, the resolution began with compulsory school attendance for all
children. It then included regulations protecting women and children and
setting daily and weekly working hours. There were sections on health and
accidents; cottage industry; freedom of association; migration; the need for
a minimum wage; the introduction of comprehensive social insurance; the
creation of international maritime rights; the enforcement of a factory
inspection; and, finally, an international labour office and international
labour conferences. One important point was that half the participants
with voting rights at these conferences were to be trade-union representa-
tives. An even more important point was that the decisions of these
conferences were to be ‘‘binding in the areas in which they were
cognizant’’. This meant the creation of an international, supranational
decision-making body, a logical consequence of the idea behind the
League of Nations. As late as 1917, the corresponding wording had been
much less binding, stating that the resolutions of international conferences
should be delegated back to the governments for implementation. The
trade-union conference also passed an additional resolution on the
proposed League of Nations.
Immediately after the trade-union conference approved the resolution,
the ‘‘political’’ conference began the discussion of such a programme.
Jansson, who functioned as a rapporteur, presented a text, which proved
to be identical to the one passed by the trade-union conference. Again
there was only a brief discussion. A series of proposed changes was
rejected as not in line with the general intent of the agreement and the
text was unanimously approved on 9 February 1919.68 This display of
unity seemed to indicate that the trade-union movement would be able
to have a substantial influence on the peace talks that had already begun
in Paris.
68. The debate is documented in Ritter, Die II. Internationale 1918/1919, vol. 1, pp.
434–460.
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THE ‘‘LABOUR COMMISS ION’’ OF THE PEACE
CONFERENCE AT WORK69
In less than two months, between 1 February and 24 March 1919, the
‘‘labour commission’’ appointed by the Allied Powers laid the foundations
for the ILO. The commission was composed only of representatives of the
Allied Powers, i.e. the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and
Belgium, as well as Cuba, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, countries that
supported the Allied Powers. Except for a few politicians and one well-
known industrialist, most of the committee members – who brought with
them a number of expert advisors – were social-reformist academics of the
IALL. They also included a social democratic politician, the Belgian E´mile
Vandervelde. By contrast, the trade unions had minimal participation.
Samuel Gompers did chair the commission, but in no way intended to
plead for the Leeds or Berne programmes. The only person connected to
the two programmes, Leon Jouhaux, did not arrive until after the Berne
conference ended, i.e. after the commission had begun to meet.
The labour commission quickly disposed of procedural matters
(choosing a chairman and his deputy, setting up an office, the organiza-
tional form of the consultations etc.) and then, at its second session,
decided to use the British proposal as its basis.70 This was an important
preliminary decision, since it meant that the central focus of the
commission’s work would be the formal structures of consultations, and
not the content of the international social policy. This was a decisive
difference from the Leeds and Berne conferences, which had emphasized a
programme of protection for the working classes – and was certainly made
in the expectation that general circumstances would no doubt compel its
realization. In any event, the labour commission, however, did not address
the issue of content until the end of its discussions and then only as a
programmatic declaration of intent, although in the hope that the new
labour organization would quickly begin to realize them.
69. The ILO later undertook a fairly accurate reconstruction of the labour commission’s
discussion based on the minutes of the commission and the notes of the various delegations. This
was published in the ILO’s Official Bulletin in 1923 and then reprinted in Shotwell, Origins, vol.
2, pp. 49–322 (p. 149 provides a brief overview of the various delegations’ records). Using these
documents as a basis, Phelan presents a detailed account, ‘‘The Commission on International
Labor Legislation’’, in ibid., vol. 1, pp. 127–220. A number of the participants also published
more or less detailed memoirs, e.g. Harold Butler, Confident Morning (London, 1950), pp. 155–
176; Emile Vandervelde, Souvenirs d’un militant socialist (Paris, 1939), pp. 287–292; James T.
Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1937); Gompers, Seventy Years, vol. 2, pp.
487–494. Other accounts can be found in Francis G. Wilson, Labor in the League System: A
Study of the International Labor Organization in Relation to International Administration
(Stanford, CA [etc.], 1934) [hereafter Labor in the League System]; and Antony Alcock, History
of the International Labor Organization (New York, 1971), pp. 18–37. For another perspective
on this section, see Jasmien van Daele’s article in this issue, pp. 435–466.
70. For the British proposal of February 2, see n. 58.
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After this fundamental decision about procedure, designated as the first
reading, the labour commission took up each article in turn. In this way, a
second reading took place until the end of February. The commission
members then discussed issues with their respective delegations. On 11
March 1919 there was a third reading. American objections at that reading
led to a temporary impasse, but the commission was able to approve a final
draft on 24March. Not all the discussions at the meetings focused on issues
of fundamental principles. Many of the changes to the British draft were
editorial in nature.
Although it is not possible here to enter into the details, it is worth
pointing out that from the beginning no-one contested the structure, the
‘‘machinery’’, of the new labour organization, which consisted of regular
(if possible, annual) conferences, attended by representatives from the
member countries, and an administrative body, i.e. an international labour
office. There were, however, two very controversial points. The first was
how a country should be represented. It was clear from the outset that, in
addition to government representatives, each country would send employ-
er and worker delegates. This, however, raised the question of how each
country’s votes were to be allocated among its representatives. Various
solutions were suggested, which, for example, distributed votes among
delegates in various proportions. In the end, however, these were reduced
to two opposing proposals: giving the government representative two
votes and the employers and workers delegates one each, or giving all three
one equal vote. The intent of the first proposal was to prevent the
government representative from being outvoted by the other two
delegates, whereas the intent of the second was to keep the government
representative in check.
The main proponents of the first proposal were the British and
Vandervelde, the Belgian social democrat, whereas Samuel Gompers, in
accordancewith theAFL’s tradition of ‘‘voluntarism’’, did not see any good
in government involvement. Later he even accused Vandervelde of having
speculated that social democratic governments would soon come to power
everywhere and thus give workers a clear majority at the conferences. As
Gompers put it, ‘‘Their viewwas egotistical’’.71 TheCGT also regarded this
as deeply offensive to French ‘‘traditions of equality’’,72 as Jouhaux made
clear in a protest he read during the discussions.Nevertheless, in the end, the
labour commission approved giving the government representatives more
votes by a slim majority. Regardless of how the votes might have been
distributed, the idea that employer andworker delegateswould build a solid
and permanent coalition against the government representatives proved
over the course of the ILO’s development to be absurd.On the contrary, on
71. As stated by Gompers in 1921. Cited by Wilson in Labor in the League System, p. 46. See
also Gompers, Seventy Years, vol. 2, pp. 491f.
72. Shotwell, Origins, vol. 2, p. 301.
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controversial issues that were important for the workers, governments and
employers would usually stand together.
The second controversial point was the binding nature of conference
decisions. It soon proved to be even more explosive that the first. The
tendency of the British draft, with some qualifications, was to oblige the
member countries to convert international labour conference decisions
into national legislation. France and Italy wanted conference decisions to
be even more binding, i.e. virtually automatic. Once again, the US put up
resistance, in part due to the AFL’s traditional mistrust of national social
legislation, but also on constitutional grounds, since in the US the
individual states had jurisdiction over social policy. The discussions were
nearly broken off at the commission’s third reading,73 and intensive efforts
were required – Shotwell had a decisive role in them on the American
side74 – to negotiate a compromise acceptable to all. In the end, the
commission agreed that the conferences could both reach conventions,
which the national parliaments were to convert into legislation, and make
recommendations. The labour commission also agreed that federal states
could regard conventions as recommendations. Gompers succeeded in
adding an important clause preventing conventions or recommendations
from lessening existing social legislation on a national level.
These labour commission decisions greatly reduced the possibility,
feared by Gompers and others, that the ILO could act as an international
social parliament. Not only did they prevent conference decisions from
being binding on national parliaments, they also limited the supervision of
any resulting national legislation to an investigation and public statement
in cases where conference decisions were not applied properly. The
commission mentioned possible economic consequences if conference
decisions were not converted as national legislation, but, since no clearly
defined sanctions were announced, they remained too vague to act as a
deterrent. This was to prove the largest, most significant problem for the
ILO, and remains so today.
The issue of membership posed a separate, but uncontroversial problem.
Should membership be limited to countries in the League of Nations? At
issue were Germany and the other countries defeated in World War I,
since initially they were not allowed to participate in the League. In the
end the labour commission approved admitting these countries, since
otherwise the ILO would have remained insignificant. The final decision,
however, was left to the Allied Powers.
73. Had this taken place, the US, which in any case later rejected the League of Nations and thus
the ILO, would have been responsible for preventing even the formation of the ILO. (The US
Senate did not ratify the entire peace treaty. Only in 1934 did the US become a member of the
ILO without, however, joining the League of Nations.)
74. For Shotwell’s important role in the negotiations, see Harold Josephson, James T. Shotwell
and the Rise of Internationalism in America (Rutherford, NJ [etc.], 1975), pp. 86–90.
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Finally, the labour commission’s text included arrangements for the first
labour conference. For practical reasons, they rejected a proposal to call a
conference quickly and then, without much discussion, agreed to a date in
October 1919, chose Washington DC as the venue, set an agenda, and
established an organizational committee.
But what had happened to the specific trade-union programme? After
his return from Berne, Jouhaux had put forward that conference’s
programme and, together with the Italian representatives, argued that
the demands in it be made a binding part of the agreement. He was unable
to achieve this. The labour commission only inserted another declaration
of intent, such as it had already been contained in various memoranda at
the beginning of its discussions, and then in the preamble to the
commission’s text. There it was stated that social justice was to be the
basis of peace. The commission now added non-binding ‘‘labour clauses’’
with general statements such as, ‘‘labour should not be regarded merely as
a commodity or article of commerce’’. The principles that one should
strive for included: the freedom to organize, a living wage, the eventual
institution of an eight-hour day, enough time for rest and relaxation,
prohibition of child labour, equal wages for men and women, equal rights
for all workers in any given country, and the guarantee of a factory
inspection.
With this the commission ended its work on 24 March, but not before
Gompers had made a final dramatic statement. He told the commission
that he had been uncertain whether he could approve the document until
the very last minute, but that, after a sleepless night, he would now approve
it and undertake a campaign in the US to gain its acceptance there.75 The
commission’s document, however, had still to be submitted for approval at
the peace conference. On 11 and 28 April 1919 it was approved by the full
session and incorporated in identical wording in the peace agreements of
each of the defeated countries.76
The Allied Powers negotiated these peace agreements without input
from the defeated countries, which then had to accept them as they were.
75. The minutes as published are unclear on this point. I here follow the version of Phelan, who
drafted the English protocol as conference secretary. See Shotwell, Origins, vol. 1, pp. 197f.
Phelan had this to say about Gompers’s position: ‘‘It was difficult to avoid the conclusion that his
heart had never been wholly in the work. His philosophy of the labour movement, implied in
speech after speech, was clearly antagonistic to labour legislation, and the scheme in one work
was a scheme to secure labour legislation. [:::] Although the members felt deeply the solemnity of
his declaration, it is doubtful if they realized how much his decision meant to him, or how real
was the opposition he realized he must meet.’’
76. Phelan, ‘‘The Labor Proposals Before the Peace Conference’’, in ibid., pp. 199–220. The
agreement was incorporated as Part XIII of the Versailles Treaty with Germany, as Part XIII of
the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria, as Part XIII of the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary,
as Part XII of the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, and as Part XII of the Treaty of Sevres with
Turkey.
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The agreement with Germany was the most important one. After the
German delegation received their agreement in May, they protested it in
vain, objecting also to the ILO’s section, although it was of course less
important than the far more onerous sections on responsibility for the
war, reparations, and other matters that cannot be addressed in this
article.77 Legien was a member of the German delegation and was
accompanied by several trade unionists from the Christian trade-union
federation that did not belong to the IFTU. In a statement that was
distributed internationally as a wireless message, Legien attacked the
agreement in general and the ILO section in particular, stating that
Germany should be allowed to join the ILO immediately, and that the
Berne programme should immediately be put into effect.78 This was
repeated a few days later in the official German counterproposal to the
international labour protection programme. The German draft, as did the
Berne programme, emphasized ‘‘content’’ over ‘‘form’’, to the point that
the future organization itself was of secondary importance. In addition,
an international trade-union conference in Paris was called for, to work
out the details.
The Allied reaction was brusque. Shotwell noted in his diary that this
was ‘‘not an honest statement [:::]. The Germans, who have just put down
radical socialism in a civil war in the streets of Berlin, cannot expect us to
take this seriously.’’79 The Allies feared that the German government, by
mobilizing international labour for more far-reaching demands, wanted to
divide them and so overturn the peace agreement. In the following weeks
both sides issued a number of statements on the issue. Germany – which in
contrast to the Allies had a social democratic government – demanded that
the trade unions be given 50 per cent of the votes at the labour conferences,
77. Ewald Kuttig, ‘‘German Preparations and Proposals’’, and ‘‘Exchange ofNotes’’, in Shotwell,
Origins, vol. 1, pp. 221–258. See also Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace
Conference (New York, 1941), pp. 75–77, 188–193.
78. Correspondenzblatt, no. 22, 31 May 1919.
79. Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference, p. 318. Later, in a footnote to Ewald Kuttig’s article
on the German proposals, Shotwell stated that the ILO principles were not worked out with a
view to addressing all trade-union demands, but rather such that the text could be accepted by all
governments, including those of the former Central Powers. He wrote, ‘‘That the German
negotiators should make such far-reaching demands for immediate adoption was unfortunately
interpreted by the Allied negotiators as part of a diplomatic move on the part of Germany rather
than a real concern for the preparation of a treaty text capable of acceptance and ratification by
governments and legislatures. It was interpreted as a bid for labour support in the Allied
countries by which public opinion would be divided and German propaganda [would] have
greater scope to work. This impression was accentuated by the further demands of the German
Delegation referred to here, that the Peace Conference should invite a conference of trade unions
to remake the labour section of the Treaty, with the further implication that the resolutions of
such a conference should be accepted as binding upon governments’’; Shotwell, Origins, vol. 1,
pp. 242f. However, for a similar opinion by an historian today, see Heinrich Potthoff,
Gewerkschaften und Politik zwischen Revolution und Inflation (Dusseldorf, 1979), p. 210.
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and that the decisions of those conferences be binding. The German
protest, however, achieved nothing, given that the peace agreement was
not negotiable. The Germans were simply reminded that the labour
conference scheduled in Washington DC was the proper place to discuss
concrete workers’ rights issues. However, it wasn’t at all clear whether the
Germans could even attend this conference.
THE IFTU’S RE-FOUNDING CONGRESS IN AMSTERDAM
(28 JULY – 2 AUGUST 1919 )
The delegates to the IFTU re-founding congress80 now had to make a
decision. Their main task was to overcome the split into the two war
camps and to reorganize the IFTU. The two former war camps found
themselves reuniting in the process of forging a common position on the
ILO. They agreed not only about their participation in the ILO, but also
shared a more general stance toward the entire League of Nations. A
commission led by Jouhaux and the Dutchman Edo Fimmen (in his first
position as an international trade-union leader) introduced a resolution to
compare the Berne decisions with the principles in the ILO Charter
point-for-point. The perhaps not so surprising conclusion was that the
ILO Charter either did not incorporate the Berne decisions, or
incorporated them only in diluted form. The commission concluded that
the trade-union movement must continue to fight to realize the goals of
the Berne conference.
Gompers then introduced a brief counter-resolution, which, without
going into the details, stated that the ILO Charter did not always
correspond with IFTU demands. Nevertheless, he said that they should
begin putting the charter into effect immediately, using the not
particularly intelligent argument that Rome wasn’t built in a day.
Jouhaux and others replied that they had not drawn up a maximum
programme in Berne, but rather a minimum one81 that could be fulfilled
anywhere. We are here, after all, an Austrian delegate added, because we
have come to an independent workers’ conference. The congress then
passed Jouhaux’s resolution by a wide majority. Only the British
delegation voted for Gompers’s resolution.82
If the IFTU congress had limited itself to the critique of principles in
Jouhaux’s resolution, their participation in the Washington labour
conference would have been surprising. However, not to participate
80. Bericht u¨ber den Internationalen Gewerkschaftskongreß. Abgehalten im Councertgebouw
in Amsterdam vom 28. Juli bis 2. August 1919 (Heinschließlich Bericht u¨ber die Vorkonferenz,
abgehalten am 25., 26. und 29 Juli 1919) (Amsterdam, 1919).
81. In his welcoming address, the Dutch trade-union chairman Oudegeest had gone so far as to
speak of the ‘‘socialist and revolutionary character’’ of the Berne conference; ibid., p. 23.
82. For the corresponding discussion and resolution, ibid., pp. 43–46.
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would have been surprising as well, because this would have run counter to
the reformist position that had prevailed in the IFTU since World War I.
Probably with this in mind, the commission introduced a separate
resolution stating that the IFTU should attend the Washington conference
in order to speak in favour of its own more comprehensive demands.
However, they made IFTU participation dependent on the following two
conditions: All countries were to be represented – here they had the
participation of Germany and the other defeated countries in mind – and
the workers were to be exclusively represented by the IFTU member
organizations. Only if this was accepted, was participation possible. In
addition, at the Washington conference, the IFTU delegates were not only
to demand that the full Berne programme be realized, but that the ILO be
reorganized. They were also to request that workers’ and employers’
delegates have the same number of votes at the labour conferences as the
government representatives (i.e. that each of the three types of delegates
have one vote each) and that the decisions of the conferences be more
binding.
After this separate resolution was read, Jouhaux called for immediate
approval by acclamation. At this point, Gompers, along with the British
delegation, once again objected. He argued that the IFTU as such had not
attended either Leeds or Berne and so was not bound by the decisions of
those conferences. He added that, although they were in agreement that
the ILO charter’s ‘‘labour clauses’’ were not satisfactory, the IFTU should
attend the Washington conference in any case. Legien then replied and a
serious argument ensued. The divisions between the former war camps
immediately resurfaced, to the dismay of the former ‘‘neutral’’ trade-union
representatives. Jouhaux and Legien then also got into an argument, but, in
the end, the commission was able to agree by a wide majority on the
resolution. Gompers remained alone in his demand for an amendment
calling for the elimination of the clauses about the necessary participation
of all countries as well as about the binding nature of the guidelines for the
IFTU delegates. This led the Scandinavian and Swiss delegates to state after
the end of the congress (i.e. it was not recorded in the conference minutes)
that, if all IFTU countries were not invited, and if some IFTU member
organizations nevertheless sent delegates to Washington, they would have
to review their continued membership in the IFTU.83
THE WASHINGTON LABOUR CONFERENCE
(29 OCTOBER – 29 NOVEMBER 1919 )
The newly elected IFTU leadership thus had a binding mission, with
which it was almost completely occupied for the next two months. In
83. As reported in Correspondenzblatt, No. 38, 20 September 1919. See also below.
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intensive negotiations with the Allies on the one hand, and the Germans on
the other, they were able to gain immediate and unconditional full
participation for Germany by the middle of October 1919.84 The irony
was, however, that the decision came so late that the Germans, who had
already chosen a delegation composed of government, employer, and
worker representatives, were not able to send that delegation to
Washington on time.
During the IFTU leadership’s efforts to gain Germany’s participation in
the Washington conference, the issue of the IFTU being the sole
organization representing workers was forgotten. The IFTU refounding
congress had made this one of the conditions of IFTU participation in the
Washington conference, as compensation, so to speak, for the Berne
programme’s not being accepted. The Allied representatives, however, had
immediately made it clear that no concession could be made here, since this
would interfere with the autonomy of governments. In September and
October 1919, the IFTU letters to the Allies addressed only German
participation in the Washington conference. (In practice, however, after
the Washington conference, the IFTU did represent the workers almost
exclusively, although occasionally individual governments made decisions
that ran counter to this.)
After the Germany entry into the ILO was quickly confirmed by an
overwhelming majority, the delegates to the Washington conference85
approved six agreements and six recommendations that included wide-
reaching social-policy regulations. The agreement on the eight-hour day
(or a forty-eight-hour week) in particular proved to be of extraordinary
symbolic value and seemed to convince all sceptics in the IFTU. The real
problem, however, turned out to be the ratification of these agreements
and their translation into national laws. The optimism of the delegates at
the Washington conference, who believed that ratification would follow
within a year, quickly proved to be illusory. In reality, even social
84. For a brief overview, see: Phelan, ‘‘The Admission of the Central Powers to the International
Labor Organization’’, in Shotwell: Origins, vol. 1, pp. 259–282. For a brief sketch, see Erster
Ta¨tigkeitsbericht des Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbundes (Juli 1919 – Dezember 1921).
Vorgelegt dem Ordentlichen Kongreß Rom, April 1922 (Amsterdam, 1922), pp. 27–31. The
IFTU archive was lost at the beginning of World War II, but Shotwell copied extensive material
from it (as he did from other archives) in the early 1930s while writing his history of the
development of the ILO. These copies are today kept in the ILO archive in Geneva; the
documents relevant to this discussion are filed under the call number 5.20. The ILO archive also
contains the records of the organizational committee the Allies created for the Washington
conference in April 1919. These records too contain a great deal of correspondence on the subject
at issue (D 600/2/9).
85. Harold. B. Butler, ‘‘The Washington Conference’’, in Shotwell, Origins, vol. 1, pp. 305–330;
and International Labor Conference: First Annual Meeting October 29 1919 – November 29
1919 (Washington DC, 1919). For the IFTU’s view, see: Erster Ta¨tigkeitsbericht des
Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbundes 1919–1921, pp. 31–33.
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democratic governments were reluctant to approve an eight-hour day. As a
result, the IFTU was not able to celebrate its successful influence on the
ILO, but rather had to make ‘‘ratification of the Washington working-
hours agreement’’ one of its central campaign themes for the years to
come.86
As a result, the IFTU concentrated on guaranteeing its own organiza-
tional influence and, in the end, this proved to be the real result of its
participation in the Washington conference. Since Part XIII of the
Versailles Treaty had only very general guidelines on the development
and structure of the ILO, the Washington conference delegates estab-
lished certain precedents. For example, objections to the credentials of
delegates – a problem that in the future was mainly to affect workers’
delegates – were to be handled by an ILO conference committee and
then be discussed in full session.87 However, the most important
precedent concerned the internal organization of the ILO conferences
according to groups rather than national delegations. This was because of
the IFTU’s decision well in advance to intervene ‘‘as a faction’’. Already,
at a meeting in early October 1919, the IFTU Bureau had decided to
convene all IFTU delegates for preparatory discussions in Washington,
for which the AFL would provide the infrastructure. Once in Washing-
ton, they formed a permanent workers’ group with a chairman and a
secretary and worked out a position for every conference agenda item.88
‘‘The government representatives [and employer delegates, one should
add, R.T.] adopted the same procedure and thus today, although Part
XIII of the Versailles Treaty does not provide for it, the group has
become a part of the normal mechanism of ILO conferences.’’89
86. See Lex Heerma van Voss, ‘‘The International Federation of Trade Unions and the Attempt
to Maintain the Eight-Hour Working Day’’, in Frits van Halthoon and Marcel van der Linden
(eds), Internationalism in the Labour Movement 1830–1940, 2 vols (Leyden [etc.], 1988), vol. 2,
pp. 518–542. For an excellent case study of one of the main governments involved, see Stephan
Grabherr, Das Washingtoner Arbeitszeitu¨bereinkommen von 1919. Versuch einer internationa-
len Regelung der Arbeitszeit in Europe (Berlin, 1992).
87. Butler, ‘‘The Washington Conference’’, in Shotwell, Origins, pp. 313f. The conflicts
surrounding credentials of delegates soon became an ‘‘endemic’’ problem, and even today is
one of the main topics in the literature on the ILO. For example, see the section, ‘‘Conflicts
Concerning Credentials and Committee Seats’’, in Torsten Landelius, Workers, Employers and
Governments: A Comparative Study of Delegations and Groups at the International Labour
Conference 1919–1964 (Stockholm, 1965), pp. 259–520; and the chapter, ‘‘Credentials:
Procedure and Requirements’’, in Abdel Karim Tikrit, Tripartism and the International Labour
Organization. A Study of the Legal Concept: Its Origins, Function and Evolution in the Law of
Nations (Stockholm, 1982), pp. 183–246.
88. For the IFTUBureaumeeting, see the copies of the IFTU leadership’s correspondence in the
ILO archive (5.24. A05; 5.24. A07; 5.24. A08; 5.24 A14).
89. Zehn Jahre Internationale Arbeitsorganisation. Vorwort von Albert Thomas (Geneva, 1931),
p. 47.
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‘‘Constitutive’’, however, might be a better word than ‘‘normal’’, since
these groups then assumed the fundamental initiative at ILO conferences.
Through its concerted presence at the Washington conference, the
workers’ group was also able to influence the most important personnel
decision in its favour, the choice of director. This decision was to
determine the character of the ILO’s development. The workers’ group’s
choice of candidate expressed the trade-union movement’s disappointment
in the entire process, from the way the ILO had been structured to the
results of the Washington conference, which they saw as inadequate. The
delegates did not choose the Englishman Harold Butler, who had been
Barnes’s closest collaborator in the formation of the ILO. Butler had also
done important groundwork as secretary of the organizational committee
and seemed to have his hand in almost everything. In a surprise move,
Jouhaux proposed a candidate who wasn’t even present at the conference,
the French Socialist Albert Thomas.
Thomas had been the French Minister of Armament during World War
I and so the rest of the French delegation accepted his candidacy.
However, he was, above all, the candidate of the workers’ group, due to his
many years of activity in the labour movement. Thus he could be expected
to be familiar with the subject of the ILO, even though he had not helped
establish it. (However, he had been a delegate to the ‘‘political’’ conference
in Berne in February, 1919.) By contrast, Butler was a career civil servant
and so lacked connections to the trade-union ‘‘milieu’’.90
Thomas, whose final approval was delayed several months, proved to
be the ideal director and gave the ILO an independent character, even
with respect to the League of Nations. He was able to do this by using his
many and varied contacts in the international trade-union movement to
bind the IFTU closely to the ILO, even though there was still tension
between the two organizations at times. In fact, after his untimely death
in 1932, there were never again to be such close ties between the ILO and
the IFTU. I cannot assess these organizational ties or the political
advantages they provided both organizations here.91 However, this close
relationship would certainly not have developed without Thomas,
particularly since the results of the Washington conference led to fierce
criticism within the IFTU. Critics had wanted the conference to call for
direct intervention in the world economy. However, they had remained
in the minority at the conference and were thus convinced that even
90. Thomas was only provisionally elected director at the Washington conference. His real
election came after the conference at the first meeting of the ILO board. See: Proce`s-verbaux de
la premie`re session du Conseil d’Administration du Bureau International du Travail (Geneva,
1920); and Phelan, Yes and Albert Thomas (London, 1936), pp. 13–18. The best biography of
Thomas is still B.W. Schaper, Albert Thomas. Trente ans de re´formisme social (Assen, 1950).
91. For references and an evaluation, see Goethem, De Internationale van Amsterdam, pp. 123–
124; and Tosstorff, Zur Geschichte des Internationalen Gewerkschaftsbundes, pp. 24–30.
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many of the workers’ delegates had been too modest in their demands.92
It was necessary to convene a special congress of the IFTU in November
1920 in order to close ranks on this issue.93 When Thomas took the
podium at the next regularly scheduled IFTU congress in April 1922,
only one delegate protested.94
CLOSING REMARKS
Altogether it is important to emphasize that the actual form of the ILO
was merely a pale reflection of the demands and expectations that the
trade-union movement had formulated during World War I. Rather than
‘‘content’’, the ILO offered only ‘‘form’’. This was first and foremost a
consequence of the IFTU’s exclusion from the real decision-making
process in early 1919. The IFTU member organizations’ support for the
war did not pay off in the sense that the IFTU was recognized as a partner
in discussions and decisions. The fact that the US trade unions, represented
by Gompers, did participate in this process changed nothing, since they
did not want to create an international institution with broad powers. This
reflected the AFL’s basic mistrust of government intervention in labour
matters, for which the phrase ‘‘voluntarism’’ has been coined. Gompers’s
position bears a curious resemblance to contemporary debates about the
developments of the international system and the rejection of a multilateral
decision-making structure.
The IFTU, however, quickly reconciled itself with this situation
because on the one hand the political climate favourable to more far-
reaching demands had already begun to change during the course of
1919; on the other hand, the global postwar economic upswing ended in
1921. In addition, in 1920, the struggle with the communists for
hegemony in the trade-union movement began (‘‘Moscow’’ versus
‘‘Amsterdam’’).95 Thus the IFTU came to see an alliance with the
ILO (in particular since Thomas was director of the ILO) as a forum
within which as many IFTU demands as possible could be raised and
thus brought closer to implementation. Only in the following years did
92. This criticism was made by the Italian workers’ delegate in Washington, who, together with
the Swiss and Polish workers’ delegates, published a statement critical of the IFTUmajority. It is
printed in L. d’Aragona & G. Baldesi, Rapporti internazionali (Milan, 1921), pp. 6, 31. See also,
‘‘Rapport de Gino Baldesi de´le´gue´ de la C.G.T. italienne’’, in La vie ouvrie`re, nos 30–32, from 30
January to 13 February 1920.
93. Bericht u¨ber den Außerordentlichen Internationalen Gewerkschaftskongreß. Abgehalten im
Holborn-Restaurant, London, 22. bis 27. November 1920 (Amsterdam, 1921).
94. Bericht u¨ber den Außerordentlichen Internationalen Gewerkschaftskongreß. Abgehalten in
Rom vom 20.–26. April 1922 im Teatro Argentino (Amsterdam, 1923), p. 63.
95. This was the result of the founding of a communist trade-union international. See Reiner
Tosstorff, Profintern: Die rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale 1921–1937 (Paderborn, 2004).
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it become evident that the ILO was really just a public platform for
trade-union demands, not the decisive lever by which they could be
realized. By that time, however, the IFTU had become so wedded to
working within the framework of the ILO that it did not resume the
more campaign-orientated policy it had pursued in the early postwar
years.
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